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It is a world ofchange in which we live, and a world of uncertainty. We live only by
knowing something about the future. . .This is as true ofbusiness as ofotherspheres
of activity...
Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit
The banking system has commanded more
than the usual public attention during the past
several years. In the process, Congress has
passed legislation requiring fuller disclosure of
bankassets, suchas ofthe kinds ofloans made by
banks. Yet despite the sudden scrutiny of bank
lending practices, many observers have over-
looked the fact that banks as financial institu-
tions have changed greatly in the past two
decades. Banks have become more aggressive in
seeking out lendable funds and have widened the
spectrum of their borrowers, but at the cost of
increased risk exposure. The greater risk has not
been confined to banks alone. The "real" or
nonfinancial world is a much riskier placethanit
was ten to fifteen years ago, and this develop-
ment has reflected back upon the banks.
This increase in real-world risk has been
accompanied by a growing corporate reliance
upon external sources of funds. During the
relatively stable period of the 1950s and 1960s,
corporations restructured their balancesheets on
a massive scale, substituting debt for equity and
increasing the leverage ofthe firm. However, as
the world became more risky in the 1970s,
corporations found themselves more firmly
locked into external financing, and hence more
vulnerable to random shocks in the economy.
This paperexamines the increase in real-world
risk and uncertainty that appeared in the 1970s,
and the effects of that increase in risk upon
financial institutionsand markets. Ourapproach
is to compare the performance of economic
*Research Officer, Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco.
5
forecasters during the period 1971-75 with their
performance during an earlier period, 1961-65,
when there was a demonstrably lesser degree of
uncertainty and less pressurefrom business upon
external sources of finance, particularly the
banking system.
The past several years have had a chastening
effect upon forecasters. Several random
shocks-the introduction of a system of wage/
price controls and the imposition of an oil
embargo with its concomitant quadrupling of
crude oil prices-introduced elements of uncer-
tainty and risk that had not been built into
econometric forecasting models nor into the
assumptions and expectations of judgmental
forecasters. The deterioration in the accuracy of
forecasting results evident during this period not
only provided a source ofembarrassment to the
forecasters themselves, but also served as a
measure ofthe uncertainty and risk prevailing in
real-world markets for labor and commodities
and services, with transmitted effects felt in
financial markets as well.
Serious over- and under-estimates offorecast
magnitudes occurred in thedifficult period ofthe
early 1970s, which culminated in the 1974-75
recession, the most severe cyclical downturn in
forty years. In an evaluation of the forecasting
efforts of this period, Stephen McNees argued
that the forecast errors were atypical in terms of
their magnitudes. I Accordingly, the size of the
variations in realized values from anticipated
values was symptomatic of the heightened
uncertainty in the environment in which
decision-makers functioned.Forecasting, Uncertainty and Risk
From the Roman augurs, who used the
entrails of animals, to present-day economists,
with their elaborate econometric models, men
have attempted in many ways to foretell the
future-and with varying degrees ofsuccess. In
this paper, we use the degree of forecasting
success as a measure of risk. For example, if a
decision maker consistently estimates the actual
values of the variables which are important to
him, there is no uncertainty. But if a decision
maker fails to estimate the actual values
accurately, uncertainty is generated-unless, of
course, the forecaster's methodology is clearlyat
fault.
In our analysis, we compare individual
forecast observations with the.actual values-
whether output or prices-and also with the
mean estimates of forecast. This results in two
sets ofcomparisons which involve the dispersion
of forecast observations about the actual value
and the mean of forecast values, respectively.
The dispersion ofobservationsaroundthe actual
value reveals the degree oferrorofforecast. The
distribution of forecast observations around the
forecast mean says something about the relative
certainty of the forecasters as a group regarding
the outlook. The basic data-annual changes in
real GNP and in the inflation rate-are from the
compilation of published forecast estimates
made by the Federal Reserve Bank of Rich-
mond.2 The forecasts are limited to one year or
four quarters ahead ofthe periods to which the
forecasts apply. At this range, the manner in
which the forecast is constructed, whether
judgmental or in the form of an econometric
model, is largely a matter of indifference,
although it is generally agreed that judgmental
forecasts have an edge withina yearorless, while
econometric models generally provide better
results over longer periods.3
To adjustfor trend, we expresstheestimates in
terms of percentage deviation from the actual
value or mean forecast value since the levels of
the forecast variables had risen substantially
between the two periods considered. Further, to
place the results on a common footing, we
compare the estimates in terms of the mean
absolute error (MAE)-the average variation of
the forecast observations from the actual value
(or mean forecast estimate) without regard to
Mean Absolute Error of the Forecast Estimates




























































.029algebraic sign.4 This simplymeans thatwe ignore
whetherthe forecast estimates are on the high or
low side oftheactualvalue. Thelargerthe MAE,
the greater the error of forecast for that
particular period.
The MAE has been calculated for the
variation of the forecast observations from the
mean value ofthe forecast estimates, MAEF, as
well as the variation from the actual values of
real GNP and the rate of inflation, MAEA (see
table). A low value for the mean forecast
estimate (MAEF) implies a greater degree of
consensus among forecasters regarding the
outlook, since the dispersion of observations
about the mean is narrow. However, a low value
for MAEF does not necessarily go hand in hand
with a low value for MAEA, which represents a
"good" forecast. All the forecasters could be
wrong together, so as we shall see, conviction
and confidence are not sufficient conditions for
successful forecasting.
MAEA values for real GNP suggest some
improvement in forecaster's ability to predict
real output took place between 1961-65 and
1971-75, with the striking exception of 1974,
when, with few exceptions, forecasters missed
the turning point in the cycle. Still, a 6.6-percent
error in forecast estimates for that year does not
reflect favorably upon the forecasting fraternity,
especially since it exposed decision makers to a
large degre~ ofrisk. Moreover, MAEFvaluesfor
1974 and 1975 output show a larger variance-
and thus more uncertainty-than obtained in
any earlier year ofthe two periods considered.
For the price forecasts, the MAEF was much
smaller in each period, indicating that fore-
casters held a much closer consensus on price
movements than they did for changes in real
GNP. Also, forecasters were significantly more
successful in estimating prices in 1961-65 than in
1971-75-notsurprisinglysince 1961-65 was part
of the longest period of price stability in recent
history. As Zarnowitz has shown, forecasting
ability is generally good during periods of
stability.5 From 1958 through 1965, prices
increased at annual rates of IY2 - I:y,; percent,
strongly conditioning the price expectations of
forecasters. Moreover, during this period oflow
and relatively stable inflation rates, corporations
substantially restructured their balance sheets,
selling debt in preference to equity under
comparatively favorable conditions in the
financial markets.
From 1968 through 1972, prices increased
about 5 percent annually, and the expectations
of decision makers gradually became geared to
this rate. But then prices increased even faster, in
an acceleration that was as sharp as it was
unexpected, with the inflation rate reaching 13
percent at the cyclical peak in 1974. Since
corporations had by this time reached a higher
"preferred" leverage ratio, the resulting reliance
upon debt financing made them particularly
vulnerable to the rising interest rates that
followed in the wake of a rapidly increasing
inflation rate.
Uncertainty and Risk
An increase in uncertainty in real markets
should not impinge heavily on financial markets
when corporations do not depend on them as a
steady source offunding. By the 1970s, however,
just such a dependence developed, as significant
changes occurred in corporate balance sheets.
Debt came to be used extensively in preference to
equity, and leverage rose from 25 percent in
1961-65 to 44 percent in 1971-75. This increase in
leverage, while it succeeded in increasing the
return to common stockholders, also made
corporations more vulnerable to changes in
interest rates, since interest payments have a
senior claim on corporate earnings. These shifts
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are seen in Chart I, which illustrates the
relationships between interest coverage and the
capital income share ofgross corporate product.
Interest coverage is defined as the ratio ofprofits
before taxes plus net interest, to net interest;
capital income is defined as corporate profits
plus depreciation adjustment plus net interest.
Interest coverage remained stable at about II
"times interest" throughout the entire 1961-65
period. Moreover, the return to corporate
capital increased steadily during that period, as
capital income rose from 7 percent to 10 percent
ofgrosscorporateproduct,providingan increas-
ing cushion against interest claims6 By 1971,Chart 1
Interest Coverage and Return to Capital
Return to Capital )I--
0.08
0,02
* Profits before tax plus net interest, divided by net interest
** Capital income as a percentage of gross domestic product of nonfinancial
corporations
however, the picture changed as corporations
completed the transition to a more highly lever-
aged capital structure. The "times interest"
coverage ratio dropped sharply to a level of5. In
addition the rate ofreturn on capital,afterpeak-
ing in 1966, trended downward from over 8
percent to 6 percent during the 1971-75 period.
The "times interest" ratio is a worthwhile
measure ofrisk because it measures the corpora-
tion's interest burden in terms of the relative
vulnerability or exposure of its balance sheetJ
Consider the relationship of the interest cover
and the rate of return on capital in each period.
The times interest ratio declined by more than
half between 1961-65 and 1971-75, while the
return on capital trended downward between
these two periods. Even if interest rates could
have been held constant, the corporate financial
position clearly entailed more risk in 1971-75.
And as will be seen later, interest rateswere by no
means constant.
Financing a Capitai Expansion
Percent
Chart 2
Maturity Structure of Corporate
Debt and Ratio of Capital

















34 ~.....: Short-term debt!
Long-term debt
At the same time that corporations were
realigning their balance sheets to achieve greater
financial leverage, they were also embarking
upon an extended capital boom. These two dis-
parate developments combined to create great-
er demands upon external sources of funds,
especially short-term funds. In the early 1960s,
the ratio of short-term to long-term debt was
fairly steady, with short-term debt amounting to
one-quarter ofoutstanding long-term debt. Sub-
sequently, theproportionofshort-termdebtrose
rapidly, except during the 1969-70 recession
(Chart 2). The increase in the relative amountof
short-term debt paralleled the increase in the
proportion of capital expenditures financed ex-
ternally. This might suggest that the capi~l
expansion was financed in increasing degree by
dependence upon short-term financing. How-
ever, corporations also relied heavily on short-
term borrowings for inventoryfinancing. Infact,
the sharp declines in the short-term/long-term
debt ratio in 1969 and again in 1975 largely
reflected the declining need forshort-terminven-
tory financing during those two periods of
receding economic activity.
8In the past 20 years, corporations not only
borrowed more from banks but also redis-
covered •the commercial-paper market, using
thatalternativewhenevermarket ratesofinterest
were morefavorable than bank rates. Corporate
treasurers became increasingly sensitive to
interest-rate differentials, and raised as much as
possible in short-term markets whenever the
interest-rate spread was favorable. In fact, they
continued to rely on short-termfunds even when
the spread turned against them. In the early
1970s, as interest rates rose to ever-higher levels,
corporations elected.to borrowatshort-term-
even at higher rates-rather than commit them-
selves to long-term debt obligations.This intro-
duced another element of risk, since short-term
debt must constantly be rolled over at possibly
ever-higher rates. And this is precisely what
happened, even while corporations increased
their short-term borrowings from a cyclical low
of28 percent oftotal debt in 1972 to a peakof37
percent in 1974.
Inflation and Interest Rates
Nat by coincidence, interest rates and prices
surged upward together during the 1971-75 peri-
od. The average long-term interest rate generally
moves on a roughly parallel path with the infla-
tion rate, with a margin between the two series
representing the "real" rate ofinterest (Chart 3).
During the 1961-65 period, when the inflation
rate was in a narrow range of 11;2 to I%percent,
the long-term interest rate held verysteadyat 41;2
percent. Short-term interest rates similarly are
subject to inflationary expectations, although to
a lesser degree because they are also strongly
influenced by money-market conditions. The
banks' interest rate on short-term business loans
is not market determined, being administered or
set by the banks themselves, but it is still not
Chart 3
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* All series smoothed by a five-month moving average centered on the third month.
9immune from market forces.
Fromlate 1973 untilthebeginningof1975, the
sharply rising inflation rate substantially ex-
ceeded the long-term rate on new bond issues. In
contrast, the short-term rate on business loans
followed the inflation rate upward in 1974 and
peaked at less than 1percent below the inflation
peak. In those circumstances, it would seem
advantageous for borrowers to seek funds in the
long-term market rather than from banks be-
cause of the differential in favor ot1ong-term
rates. Thatdidn'thappen, however, as borrowers
turned increasingly to the banks. The explana-
tion may be found in the special characteristics of
the 1973-74 inflation. In the words of Edward
Shaw, what we experienced was "dirty"
inflation-largely unforeseen and sporadic-
rather than "immaculate" inflation-the type
where lenders perceive perfectly the rate of
inflation and thereby become compensated
through the interest rate.8 Borrowers may have
possessed less than perfect foresight as far as
inflation and interest rates were concerned. But
at the same time, they had doubts as to the
permanence of the existing high rates and they
chose to borrow short rather than long. The
banks were the logical source for such funds.
Corporations and Banks
Businesses have always borrowedfrom banks,
largely through short-term self-liquidating loans
for such purposesas the purchaseand carryingof
inventories. However, in recent years, banks
have extended the maturity ofbusiness loans, so
that term loans with maturities greater than one
year now constitute about 40 percent of their
business-loan portfolios. Much of this shift re-
flected the tendency for corporations to rely
more heavily on the banks for all types of fi-
nancing, including the longer-term financing

















Bond Share and Bank-Loan Share of Total Funds
Raised in Financial Markets*
1976
*Percent of total net funds raised in financial markets by nonfinancial corporations.
10Nonfinancialcorporationsincreasedtheirreli·
ance upon banks steadily from 1970 through
1973, when nearlythree·quartersofthenetfunds
they raised in financial marketscame from banks
(Chart 4). The shift in 1970 and 1971 was proba·
bly prompted in some degree by the collapse of
the commercial·paper market following the
Penn Central debacle. But the percentage of
external funds raised in the capital market also
declined steadily during this period. Despite the
fact that the interest rate on bankloansexceeded
the rate on new bond issues, businessmen elected
to borrow from banks for a few months ora few
years rather than lock themselves in for longer
periods at the going interest rates prevailing in
the capital market.
In 1974, the banks were almost literally"lend·
ers of last resort," because by then the raging
inflation and high rates of interest had severely
crippled the capital market. Until corporations
re·entered thecapital markets in theeasiercondi·
tions of 1975, banks provided the major source
of external funds to business-and assumed a
commensurateshareofrisk whiledoingso. Their
assumption ofa larger than ordinary amount of
risky loans reflected the fact that they were
lending greater amounts to a greater variety of
less·than·prime borrowers.
Conclusion
The world ofthe early 1970s was a riskier place
in which to transact business and to undertake
financing than was the world of the early 1960s.
The environment in which decisions were made
came to be cloaked ingreateruncertainty. Mean·
while, by restructuring their balance sheets in
favor of debt rather than equity, corporations
assumed greater and greater risk because the
higher leverage of their capital structure left
them more exposed to a decline in the return to
capital and to an increase in interest rates. And
when the amount of their shorHerm debt grew
to nearly two·fifths of their outstanding long·
term debt, corporations had to roll over matur·
ing debt more frequently and thus became fur·
ther exposed to the vagaries of the financial
markets.
The inflation that made a shambles of the
capital markets in 1973 and 1974 forced nonfi·
nancial corporationsto rely as never before upon
the banks for accommodation. Yet the risk
accompanying this heavy volume of lending
increased more than proportionately as banks
assumed risk that would normally be shouldered
by bond holders or owners ofequity. And while
the changing structure of balance sheets made
corporations more vulnerable to changes in
financial markets, bankers themselves were be·
coming bold innovators, shedding their tradi·
tional role as risk averters and becoming profit
maximizers. All of these developments worked
together to place the financial markets and the
banking system under the severest strains of the
past 40 years.
FOOTNOTES
1. Stephen McNees. "An Evaluation of Economic Forecasts,"
New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston, November/December 1975, p. 3.
2. Thecompilation includesforecasts ofannual changes in real
GNP and in a price series-the consumer price index for 1961-
65, and the GNP implicit price deflator for 1971-75.
3. Carl F. Christ, "Judging the Performance of Econometric
Models of the U.S. Economy," International Economic Review,
February 1975, p. 57.
4. McNees. op. cit., p. 11.
5. Victor Zarnowitz, "Forecasting Economic Conditions: The
II
Record and the Prospect,"TheBusinessCycleToday, National
Bureau of Economic Research, New York, 1972, p. 195.
6. William Nordhaus, "The Falling Share of Profits," Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1974, p. 179.
7. Herbert Runyon, "Equity Shares and the Financial Markets,"
Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,
Summer 1976, p. 31.
8. Edward S. Shaw, "Inflation, Finance and Capital Markets,"
Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,
December 1975, pp. 5-6.